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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) 
and 78-2a-3(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment 
where there was no issue of material facts and no evidence of a 
confidential relationship resulting in undue influence? 
Summary judgment is proper if the evidence, depositions, affidavits, and admissions, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the losing party, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact, and therefore the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81,115,57 P.3d 997. The non-moving party has 
the burden to set before the court a genuine issue of material fact. Thayne v. Benificial Utah, 
Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). 
II. Whether the district court correctly held that the Petitioner did not meet 
his burden where he did not proffer any clear and convincing evidence 
that the decedent had an different intent when she created the joint bank 
accounts? 
Once Respondents moved for summary judgment, Petitioner had the burden to provide 
evidence in support of all of the essential elements of his claim. Thayne, 874 P.2d at 124. 
"Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving 
party or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing 
evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created." Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-
104(1). 
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III. Whether the district court properly reviewed the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Petitioner? 
Summary judgment is proper if when viewed in the light most favorable to the losing 
party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and therefore the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Norman, 2002 UT 81,115. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. RULES & REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(1); See Appellant's Addendum No. 2. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(5); See Appellant's Addendum No. 2. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-805; See Addendum No. 1. 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(k); See Addendum No. 2. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c); See Appellant's Addendum No. 1. 
UtahR. Civ. P. Rule 56(e); See Appellant's Addendum No. 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a simple case regarding the decisions made by a mentally sharp, decisive 
completely competent woman during the last months of her life. Nina E. Tolley, the 
decedent, passed away on October 16,2003. (R. 532.) During the last few months of her life 
she was cared for by the Respondents, her grandchildren, Michael Tolley and Marie Jess. (R. 
532.) The grandchildren expected they would be caring for their grandmother for a long 
time, but unfortunately and very unexpectedly she passed away after being in Utah for only 
four months. (R. 532.) 
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It was not long after this tragedy that the Petitioner accused the grandchildren of an 
improper confidential relationship with their grandmother. (R. 20.) On or about November 
5, 2003, Petitioner obtained a Temporary Restraining Order, requiring Respondent, Marie 
Jess, to turn over to Petitioner's attorney, certain funds she had received from joint accounts 
owned with her grandmother, the deceased Nina E. Tolley. (R. 18.) Respondent, Marie Jess, 
appearing at that time pro se, stipulated to the funds being held in Petitioner's attorney's 
interest bearing trust account, under the terms of the November 5, 2003 Order, for the 
pendency of this action. (R. 208; 419.) 
On or about September 15,2004, Petitioner filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment 
and Recovery of Property against Respondents. (R. 254.) In his Petition, Petitioner claims 
that Respondents obtained the funds from Ms. Tolley by either a) exercising undue influence 
over Ms. Tolley, b) violating Ms. Tolley's intentions and will, c) fraud, d) conversion, or e) 
violating a constructive trust. (R. 254; 419.) 
During the temporary restraining order hearing, held on November 5, 2003, Marie 
persistently held that the funds in the joint accounts were hers because of the right of 
survivorship. (R. 606; Appellant's Add. 3, p. 2-34.) Marie continually asserted that the will 
was not applicable to funds with the right of survivorship, and that the funds were hers. (R. 
606; Appellant's Add. 3, p. 20.) She gifted money to those whom her grandmother had 
requested, further affirming that these gifts were not given under "any legal obligation." (R. 
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606; Appellant's Add. 3, p. 34.) The district court recognized that she was not acting under 
any "fiduciary responsibility." (R. 606; Appellant's Add. 3, p. 14.) 
In August of 2005, both Respondents filed with the district court's Motions for 
Summary Judgment requesting dismissal of all claims. (R. 416; 525.) At the summary 
judgment hearing on February 15, 2006, the district court even granted Petitioner an 
additional thirty days of discovery to depose two more witnesses. (R. 1115.) After briefs had 
been filed, including supplemental briefs following continued discovery, and oral argument 
had been heard, the district court took the matter under advisement and on May 16, 2006 
granted both motions for Summary Judgment on all claims in favor of the Respondents. (R. 
1239; 1243). 
Throughout the entire process it was never disputed that Nina Tolley, the decedent, 
was always a strong willed lady to the day she died. (R. 1248.) She was mentally sharp, 
decisive, strong willed and knew exactly what she wanted and what she did not want. (R. 
1248.) Nina Tolley made up her mind, and you could not change it for her. (R. 1248.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Nina Tolley, the decedent, ("Nina") was always very firm minded. (R. 528.) Even 
up until the end of her life, she was mentally sharp, decisive, strong willed and knew exactly 
what she wanted and what she did not want. (R. 528.) Nina made up her mind, and you 
could not change it for her. (R. 528.) Even though Nina was completely mentally sharp, for 
the last several years of her life she became very physically impaired. (R. 529.) She was 
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confined to her bed or to a wheelchair and needed a lot of assistance. (R. 529.) Nina had 
only very limited use of her hands and arms, and was afflicted with bed sores for a long time. 
(R. 529.) 
Nina had three children, Cheryl, Kenneth, and the Petitioner Donald. (R. 528.) 
Kenneth, the father of Respondents Michael and Marie, predeceased Nina Tolley. (R. 528.) 
For many years Nina lived away from her family in South Dakota. (R. 420.) Because she had 
been physically dependent, for years she relied on many people, including her caretaker, 
Chris Dolecheck, to give her personal care in washing her> clothing her, cooking for her three 
times a day...etc. Mr. Dolecheck performed this service for nine years. (R. 329; 420.) 
During these years, her mental status was sharp, she was alert, and she was very sharp on her 
finances. (R. 422.) 
Nina kept in close contact with her grandchildren, the Respondents. (R. 529.) Her 
grandson Michael Tolley ("Michael") was aware of her needs and had dedicated himself to 
helping her and taking care of her. (R. 421: 897.) Michael had lived with his grandmother 
Nina at several different time periods for several years in the mid eighties and early nineties. 
(R. 529.) At one point he had even moved out to South Dakota to help care for her. (R. 529.) 
He was always very close to her. (R. 529.) They often would speak to each other by phone. 
Michael and Nina had frequently spoken about her coming to live with him and that he would 
help take care of her. (R. 529.) 
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Nina came to Utah and stayed with her granddaughter, Respondent Marie Jess 
("Marie") for a couple months in 2000 or 2001 and started talking about moving to Utah 
shortly after that visit. (R. 420.) Marie kept in close contact with her grandmother, and spoke 
with her by phone on a weekly basis. (R. 421.) Moreover, Nina kept in contact with her 
grandchildren and would telephone and correspond with them. (R. 421.) 
Nina was growing increasingly afraid for Mr. Dolecheck's health and felt that he 
would no longer be able to adequately care for her. (R. 530.) Nina did not want to move in 
with her son Donald Ray Tolley. (R. 530.) She had once stayed with him for a while and it 
had been an extremely unpleasant experience. (R. 530.) Likewise, Nina did not have a good 
relationship with her daughter Cheryl because of past differences. (R. 530.) Their 
relationship had been strained so much that at one point they did not speak to each other for 
several years.(R. 530.) 
Nina found out that her close friend and care taker Chris Dolecheck had cancer. 
Understanding that caring for her would be an increasingly difficult burden on her friend, she 
decided she would ask her grandchildren, the Respondents, to help care for her. She made 
this decision in May of 2003, two months before she actually moved. She saved for the 
move. (R. 420; 424.) Nina left South Dakota the first week of July, 2003. (R. 420.) 
Michael Tolley was living in a comfortable house, which he liked very much, he had 
only purchased about one year previously. (R. 530.) When Nina decided to move out to 
Utah, she asked him to sell his new house in order to buy another which would better fit her 
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special needs. (R. 530.) He sold it at her request, but at a financial loss. (R. 530.) Nina was 
heavily involved in the purchase of a new home. (R. 531.) Michael spent a lot of time talking 
to Nina by phone to decide which house to buy. He sent her photographs and other 
information on various houses, and finally together they decided on one. (R. 531.) Nina gave 
Michael $18, 592.11 for the down payment, because she wanted to give him a gift and also 
wanted to help him in buying the house. (R. 531.) Although the house was in his name, it 
was clear that she intended that she would live there for the rest of her life. (R. 531.) 
Michael paid the entire mortgage payments. 
Upon buying the house, Michael spent a lot of time, money, and effort in order to 
renovate the house and make it wheelchair accessible for Nina. (R. 531.) Nina was very 
particular and firm in making decisions about the house. (R. 531.) She requested that 
Michael do a lot of work on the house. (R. 531.) Upon her request, he had the kitchen floor 
redone, the walls repainted, installed a ramp and moved walls. (R. 531.) Using her credit 
card he purchased flowers and other plants to help beautify the home. (R. 531.) She was very 
proud of the flowers and of the beautiful home. (R. 531.) 
Nina frequently let trusted people use her credit cards to purchase things at her 
specific direction. (R. 530.) Generally she would telephone the store in advance to inform 
them that somebody would be coming to use her credit card. (R. 530.) But even if she didn't 
call, she only let her credit card out of her hand when she wanted somebody to specifically 
buy something for her. (R. 530.) 
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From the time that Nina moved to Utah, her Grandchildren Michael and Marie as well 
as others provided her constant medical care because of her very weakened physical 
condition, like Chris Dolecheck had previously done. (R. 532.) Marie would visit Nina daily, 
fix her lunch, give her mail, and see to any other needs. (R. 421.) Because of the problems 
with Nina's arms and right hand Marie would occasionally help her fill out checks to review 
and sign them. (R. 421.) However, Marie was not the only person who would help Nina 
write checks. (R. 421.) Marie also did shopping for Nina and took her to her doctor's visits. 
(R. 421.) Nina loved and trusted her grandchildren, and they never gave her any reason not 
to trust them.(R. 421.) 
Nina was cared for, in Michael Tolley's home, several times a week by nursing, 
physical therapy, and other healthcare professionals, including Julie Willardson, R.N. and 
therapist Kelly Springer. (R. 422.) Ms. Willardson's care for Nina included cleaning and 
dressing her bed wounds. (R. 423.) Nina was in poor health and bedridden, but her mind was 
sharp. (R. 423.) On each visit Ms. Willardson assessed her general health, as she is required 
to do. (R. 423.) In September 2003, Ms. Willardson regularly attended Nina at home, she 
cleaned and dressed her wounds. (R. 423.) Nina did not appear to have any neurological 
deficit. (R. 423.) She was alert and oriented. (R. 423.) Nina was in her right mind and 
capable of making her own choices and decisions during the entire time that Ms. Willardson 
treated Nina, specifically the week of September 22-26, 2003. (R. 423.) 
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Ms. Springer's care for Nina included stretching and stabilization exercises. (R. 423.) 
She testified that although Nina was in poor health and bedridden, her mind was sharp. (R. 
423.) 6n each visit Ms. Springer also assessed Nina's general health, as she was required. 
(R. 423.) On September 22, 2003, Ms. Springer worked with Nina for approximately 45 
minutes, doing stretches and other exercises. (R. 423.) On that date Nina was pleasant and 
willing to participate. (R. 423.) On September 26,2003, Ms. Springer attended Nina in her 
home, again for approximately 45 minutes. (R. 423.) Nina was very sore that day, but was 
alert and oriented. (R. 423.) To the best of Ms. Springer's knowledge, Nina was in her right 
mind and capable of making her own choices and decisions during the entire time Ms. 
Springer treated her in the home, in particular, during September, 2003. (R. 424.) 
Nina stayed in contact with her good friend, Mr. Chris Dolecheck, they spoke almost 
every day. (R. 422.) He had been and continued to be her confidant. (R. 422.) During these 
conversations she never complained to Mr. Dolecheck about her living conditions, anyone 
taking advantage of her, her healthcare, etc... (R. 422.) He testified that while Nina's physical 
strength may have deteriorated in the months leading up to her death, he confirms that her 
mental acuity, her strong will, and her ability to make up her own mind did not diminish and 
that she remained an individual who was in control of her faculties. 
When Nina came to Utah, she opened a bank account at Bank One. (R. 424.) Later 
she became dissatisfied with Bank One because of the manner they managed her account and 
processed her social security checks. (R. 424.) Nina spoke with the manager of Bank One, 
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Shelly Christopher, and tried to resolve the matter. (R. 424.) Ms. Christopher spoke with 
Nina many times by phone during the first month the account was open, and again after the 
account had been closed. (R. 1148.) During all of these conversations she testified that Nina 
was mentally sharp. (R. 1148.) She said, "she was very alert. I do have customers that I 
can...tell when they start to lose their mind...She just to me sounded like and seemed not only 
in person but also on the phone as together mentally as we are..." (R. 1147-48.) She testified 
that Nina never complained to her during the course of their friendly professional relationship 
about anyone taking advantage of her. (R. 1147.) 
Despite Nina's conversations with Ms. Christopher she decided to close her accounts 
and switch banks. (R. 424; 1147.) At Nina's request, Marie called First Utah Bank, to invite 
Mr. Tim Claridge, to come to the house, meet with Nina, and explain her banking options. 
(R. 424.) Mr. Claridge was an assistant manager of First Utah Bank, at the West Valley 
Office. (R. 424.) On or about September 25,2003, he met with Nina and her granddaughter, 
Marie, at Michael's home. (R. 424.) When Mr. Claridge met with Nina, he discussed the 
reasons for her opening accounts at First Utah Bank. (R. 425.) She told Mr. Claridge that she 
was upset with the way her account was managed at Bank One and was switching to First 
Utah Bank. (R. 425.) Mr. Claridge discussed various banking options with Nina and 
ascertained from her which types of accounts she wanted and how much money she wanted 
to deposit in each. (R. 425.) Marie did not participate in the majority of the conversation, but 
only a "bit of small talk." (R. 1149-50.) Nina and Mr. Claridge discussed the joint right of 
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survivorship. (R. 1149-50.) Mr. Claridge testified "I do specifically remember discussing 
with her [Nina] the joint with right of survivorship topic as we signed the card...[we] 
discusseld the ownership and that is a 100 percent ownership by both parties." (R. 1129-34 
[Claridge Depo. At 34:4-12(emphasis added)].) He regularly, even in front of the additional 
signer, makes sure his customers understand the reality of joint with right of survivorship, 
and that it gives the other tenant 100 percent ownership. (R. 1150.) 
Mr. Claridge testified that Nina Tolley "was very witty and sharp...She was very 
spirited and chatty." (R. 1149.) Nina opened all three accounts as joint accounts with Marie 
with rights of survivorship, and Mr. Claridge had Nina and Marie sign signature cards for the 
accounts. (R.425.) Mr. Claridge was satisfied that Nina understood the character of the joint 
account with the right of survivorship as well as any other who opens such accounts. (R. 
1149-50.) Moreover, he tends to refer to joint accounts and the right of survivorship more 
extensively with elderly people. (R. 1150.) He testified that Marie did not state she desired 
to be a joint tenant, but it was the directive of Nina. (R. 1148; 1150.) Based upon his 
training, Mr. Claridge did not feel any indication that Nina was being coerced in any way. 
R. 1151.) During his telephone conversations with Nina, she was always comfortable with 
him and very cheerful and jovial. (R. 1151.) 
Ms. Christopher and Mr. Claridge, who consulted with the decedent regarding her 
banking and creation of the joint bank accounts with Respondent Marie confirmed that Nina 
was very particular in communicating her intentions and that she did not make any statements 
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or gestures which would indicate she was being coerced, manipulated or otherwise directed 
in her actions. (R. 1146.) Marie did not know why Nina put her name on the joint accounts. 
(R. 425.) 
Long after the accounts had been created, Nina indicated to Marie there were a few 
people she might like to gift some of the money, including family members. (R. 425.) Nina 
understood that putting her money in the joint account with the right of survivorship took the 
money out of her estate. (R. 606; Appellant's Add. 3, p. 20.) Nina affirmed to Michael that 
the money would go to Maire when she died. (R. 606; Appellant's Add. 3, p. 24.) After 
Nina's death, Marie withdrew the remaining money from her joint account and gifted some 
to a couple of relatives. (R. 606; Appellant's Add. 3, p. 2-3.) Marie understood that she was 
under no legal obligation to disburse any of the funds, and that such gifts were done because 
her grandmother had asked her. (R. 606; Appellant's Add. 3, p. 34.) 
Although Nina was physically dependant on others, she was not terminally ill. All of 
Nina's family hoped she would live for many years to come, she unfortunately and 
surprisingly passed on just months after having moved to Utah. (R. 532.) Nina Tolley passed 
away on Oct. 16, 2003. (R. 532.) 
Decedent's last-known will predated her death by over eleven years. (R. 711.) The 
will left her estate in equal shares to her three children, Kenneth John Miller, Donald Ray 
Tolley and Cheryl Lynn Blaisdell. (R. 711.) 
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It was not long after the funeral of their grandmother that Petitioner, Donald Tolley 
found that Nina had not left him the inheritance he had expected. (R. 18.) He then began to 
accuse Respondents of creating a confidential relationship with their grandmother and 
substituting their will for hers. (R. 20.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court properly determined that summary judgment was appropriate where 
the Appellant failed to proffer evidence sufficient to meet the elements of his claims, thereby 
failing to raise a genuine issue as to any material facts. Sarins v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 Ut. 
App. 203 <|[9, 94 P.3d 301. It undisputed that "Nina Tolley was always very firm minded. 
Even up to the end of her life she was mentally sharp, decisive, strong willed, and knew 
exactly what she wanted and what she did not want." (R. 1248.) Petitioner provided 
absolutely no evidence that Respondents substituted their will for hers in any of her 
decisions, and therefore there is no factual basis for a confidential relationship. Additionally, 
neither Marie nor Michael was ever a trustee or administrator of any property of Nina, and 
neither has ever stated otherwise. Moreover, no evidence has been proffered indicating that 
Nina ever established a trust. 
Furthermore, the court properly ruled that "Nina Tolley was very particular in 
communicating her intentions.. .regarding her banking and creation of the j oint bank accounts 
with Respondent" and that "Petitioner has failed to produce evidence to support any of his 
various theories against Marie Jess." (R. 1247-49.) The bank manager explained the rights 
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of survivorship to Nina and sensed she clearly understood. Where the law presumes that any 
"sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving 
party," and Petitioner did not proffer any clear and convincing evidence that Nina had "a 
different intention at the time the account was created" the court properly granted summary 
judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(1). 
The district court properly reviewed all the evidence and reasonable inferences in the 
light most favorable to the Petitioner. The Petitioner was nonetheless required to present 
supported facts and make reasonable inferences. Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, ^ [33, 20 
P.3d 876. The court properly determined that "...the Petitioner relies on inferences which 
cannot be reasonably made and incorrect interpretations of the evidence in the record," and 
that he "skewed" and "inaccurately interpreted testimony." (R. 1249.) The Petitioner 
continually misleads the court with untrue facts and statements, incomplete quotes, testimony 
taken out of context, and unreasonable inferences. Consequently, there was no genuine issue 
of material fact and summary judgment was appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT APPROPRIATELY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO PRESENT ANY 
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EVIDENCING A CONFIDENTIAL 
RELATIONSHIP. 
The district court correctly applied the legal standard for summary judgment. The 
district court took this matter under advisement and gave Petitioner more time to do 
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discovery and supplemental memoranda. The Court then carefully reviewed the entire record 
of this case, including five volumes of pleadings, documents, twelve affidavits, transcripts 
of severkl depositions (including depositions of neutral third parties), and the transcripts of 
the prior hearings. The brief of the Appellant is misleading; the district court understood its 
role and found that it was never disputed that, "Nina Tolley was always very firm minded. 
Even up to the end of her life she was mentally sharp, decisive, strong willed, and knew 
exactly what she wanted and what she did not want." (R. 1243; Order f 23.) Applying such 
evidence to the applicable legal authority, the district court held that the Petitioner did not 
provide "a shred of evidence" to indicate a relationship of inequity or dominion inferring that 
Nina Tolley's will was overpowered or overcome in any way. (R. 1243; Order f 29.) Given 
the complete absence of evidence to indicate a confidential relationship or any undue 
influence, the court determined as a matter of law, Petitioner had failed to establish any 
evidence of a confidential relationship or that the Respondents unduly influenced the 
decedent. (R. 1243; Ordet f 30.) 
The law is well established that Petitioner had the burden to set before the district 
court a genuine issue of material fact. Thayne v. Benificial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 
(Utah 1994). Summary judgment is proper if the evidence, depositions, affidavits, and 
admissions, when viewed in the light most favorable to the losing party, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and therefore the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, 115, 57 P.3d 997 (emphasis 
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added); Campbell Maack, and Sessions v. Derby, 2001 UT App 397,17, 38 P.3d 984. See 
also Jensen v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980). 
This brief will demonstrate that summary judgment was appropriate in this case 
where: first, Petitioner could not proffer any evidence to establish the essential elements of 
his claim, and second, Petitioner built his case only upon unreasonable, unsupported, and 
irrelevant inferences. 
First, Petitioner did not proffer sufficient evidence to support the elements of his 
claim. Once Respondents moved for summary judgment, Petitioner had the burden to 
provide some evidence in support of all of the essential elements of his claims. Thayne, SI4 
P.2d at 124. His burden was to set forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue 
for trial. Rawson, 2001 UT 24,133; Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979); See 
also Utah R.Civ. P. Rule 56(e). A genuine issue is an issue which is essential or material to 
the applicable rule of law. Thayne, 874 P.2d at 124; Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1983); Sanns, 2004 UT App 203,16. "Summary judgment is appropriate against a party 
who, after discovery, fails to set forth facts sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case." Christiansen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 18016,551 
Utah Adv. Rep.3; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
It is undisputed that Nina was firm minded, mentally sharp, decisive, and strong willed 
even up to the end of her life. Therefore, where Petitioner has failed to produce evidence to 
meet the elements of his claim, "there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, for 
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summary judgment purposes, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential 
element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Sarins, 
2004 UT App 203,19. 
Second, Petitioner's bald and unsupported inferences regarding a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship do not suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Rawson, 
2001 UT 24, ^ 33. The disputed facts must also have evidentiary foundation. Webster v. Sill, 
675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). "Bare contentions, unsupported by any specification of facts in 
support thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will preclude entry of summary 
judgment." Schnuphase v. Storehouse Mkts., 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996). The district court 
said, "It should be emphasized that the Petitioner has not provided one shred of evidence 
which would counter the overwhelming amount of affidavit and deposition testimony, 
including from independent third-parties... the Petitioner relies on inferences which cannot 
be reasonably made and incorrect interpretations of the evidence in the record." (R. 1249, 
Appellant's Add. 4, p. 5 [Memorandum Decision].) 
A. It Was Appropriate for the District Court to Dismiss the Appellant's 
Claim Where There Was No Evidence of a Confidential or Fiduciary 
Relationship. 
1. Elements necessary to establish a confidential relationship. 
A confidential relationship arises when one party, 1) after having gained trust and 
confidence of another, 2) exercises extraordinary influence over the other party, resulting in 
the substitution of will of the latter for the former. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766,769 
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(Utah 19S5); Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d710,713 (Utah 1965) (emphasis added). See 
also Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Petitioner must 
proffer evidence supporting both of the elements of confidentiality to have a valid claim. 
The law presumes that one ordinarily makes his or her own judgments, however imperfect, 
and acts on them; it does not readily assume that one's will has been overborne by another. 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). Therefore, the law does not lightly 
recognize the existence of a confidential relationship. Id. 
This doctrine rests upon a principle of inequality between the parties, and implies a 
position of superiority occupied by one of the parties over the other. Bradbury, 401 P.2d at 
713. The relationship of [grand]parent and [grand]child is not evidence of such confidential 
relationship as to create presumption of undue influence. Id. In order to support the second 
element, there must be an exhibition of more than influence or suggestion, there must be 
substantial proof of overpowering of the person's will. Estate of loupe, 878 P.2d 1168,1174 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2. The second element of a confidential relationship was not met. 
Petitioner did not proffer any evidence to support his claim that the Respondents 
exercised extraordinary influence over the decedent, resulting in the substitution of their will 
for hers. Respondents produced twelve affidavits and several depositions which 
unanimously agreed that Nina was strong willed, decisive, and mentally sharp. All evidence 
supported that there was no changing her mind once she had made a decision. Petitioner did 
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not provide the court with any contrary testimony, but merely unreasonable inferences which 
had no evidentiary support. 
There was no evidence of inequality or superiority between Nina and her 
grandchildren. Moreover, the grandchildren carried out their grandmother's wishes on a 
daily basis. It was undisputed that this is not a case where one person's will was substituted • 
for another, and accordingly summary judgment was appropriate. 
3. Nina Tolley did not create a trust and Respondents did not have a 
fiduciary duty to their grandmother. 
Because Petitioner cannot establish a confidential relationship by the facts and 
evidence of this case, he is now attempting to establish a confidential relationship through 
an alleged per se fiduciary relationship. Consequentially, his only issue on appeal is not 
concerning a factual finding of a confidential relationship but whether there was a legally 
presumed fiduciary relationship between Respondent Marie Jess and the decedent which 
would imply confidence. See Appellant's Brief'p. 14. Petitioner did not raise any fiduciary 
issue against Respondent Michael Tolley. 
Petitioner relies on the three sentences in the opinion of Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Walkery to incorrectly imply to this Court that a trustee has a per se confidential relationship 
with the settlor. However, the Supreme Court in Walker Bank, merely disposes of the 
contention over confidentiality because the requirement of accounting is the same whether 
based on a trustee relationship or a confidential relationship. 412 P.2d 920 (Utah 1966). 
Additionally, the facts of Walker are not applicable to this case. In Walker, the defendant 
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was the trustee of several real properties and securities he received from his sister which he 
held in trust "with the understanding that such property should be used to defray her expenses 
and burial." Id. He admitted to holding the assets in trust for this purpose. Id. 
This case is quite distinguishable, because a trust was not created. "Even if the intent 
to create a trust is assumed, it cannot be effective unless certain essential trust elements are 
properly described, namely, the subject matter, the trust purpose, and the beneficiaries." 
Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238,1244 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Supreme Court said that 
in the creation of a trust, the trust property must be clearly specified and set aside, and the 
"essential terms of the trust must be clear enough for the court to enforce..." Id. (quoting 
Sundquist v. SundquisU 639 P.2d 181,184 (Utah 1981)). 
Moreover, precatory words are generally insufficient to create a testamentary trust. 
See Estate of"Lewis, 738 P.2d 617, 620 (Utah 1987); see also CJS Wills §1437. Precatory 
expressions are non-binding words of entreaty, request, wish, or recommendation and do not 
impose a trust on the property given. See BOGERT §48; AMJUR WILLS §1021. No trust 
is created if the settlor manifests an intention to impose merely a moral obligation. REST 2d 
TRUSTS §25(b). His manifestation of intention only amounts to a suggestion or wish that 
the transferee should use or dispose of the property in a certain manner, leaving it to the 
transferee to follow the suggestion or comply with the wish only if the transferee desires to 
do so and is not a binding trust. Id. 
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The Petitioner has not provided any evidence supporting any of the essential elements 
of a trust. There is no evidence in the record indicating that the Respondents Marie or 
Michael were trustees or administrators of any the decedent's property. Neither has ever 
admitted to being a trustee, or holding funds in trust for their grandmother. The Petitioner 
has again "skewed" the facts and statements to meet his own objective. The portions of 
Marie's testimony cited by Petitioner are misleading and insufficient to create a trust where 
the essential elements of a trust have not been shown. Moreover, such testimony would not 
support a trust where it indicates precatory language which is not binding on Marie. 
Similar to this case, in Pagano v. Walker, a mother had a will dividing her property 
equally between her children. 539 P.2d 452, 453-55 (Utah 1975). She had not maintained 
a close relationship with three of her four children and therefore took money out of her estate 
and placed it in a joint bank account with her daughter. Id. The mother later told her 
daughter to "pay her personal bills, keep a little out for my arthritis and divide up the rest." 
Id. The other children attempted to show that a trust was formed. Id. The Supreme Court 
found that the contract with the bank to hold the funds in joint ownership with rights of 
survivorship could not be converted thereafter to a trust. Id. The Supreme Court held 
specifically that in order to create a trust, the trust must have been created at the time the joint 
account when the right of co-ownership and survivorship was created, and that the status of 
the account could not be changed by later statements or intentions of the mother. Id. The 
Supreme Court upheld the joint tenancy in spite of the claims of the two disinherited 
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children. Id. "That is, if the account was originally created as a true joint account with right 
of co-ownership and survivorship in Mary [daughter], as it appears to have been, that status 
would not be changed even if the mother Lucy had at some subsequent time orally made 
declarations [a trust]." Id. at 455. 
Like Pagano, no trust can be found in this case. Petitioner's claim is based solely 
upon a the fact that after Marie became the survivor of the funds through joint tenancy with 
rights of survivorship, she sent some money to relatives she believed Nina might desire to 
endow upon her death. This was not done through any obligation; the money belongs to 
Marie Jess. Nonetheless, Marie's actions do not circumvent the Supreme Court holding that 
the contract of joint survivorship cannot be broken and converted to a trust. Pagano, 539 
P.2dat455. 
The Petitioner later argues that Marie's intention to disburse the funds as her 
grandmother might have intended would relinquish control from Nina. See Brief of Appellant 
p. 17. However, the evidence proves that Marie did not take or use any of the money in the 
account with unless she was specifically directed to do so by her grandmother. Her gracious 
act, giving her own money to relatives, was done after the death of Nina, and because the 
decedent was dead this act in no way would have "relinquished control over her [Nina's] 
decision making" as the Petitioner alleges. 
The evidence indicates that Nina decided to open the joint accounts; that she 
personally spoke with and instructed the banker regarding those accounts; and that she 
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decided to put Marie on the accounts with rights of survivorship. These funds, by contract 
with the bank, fall outside the administration of Nina's Last Will and Testament. Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-6-104(5). Moreover, where the law assumes the contract made between Nina and 
the bank is valid and binding, and no evidence was given to establish that a valid trust was 
formed therefore Marie did not have any legal relationship with the decedent, and the district 
court's ruling should be upheld. 
4. Even If this Court Holds that Marie Jess was a trustee of the funds in 
the joint accounts the results are the same, and Summary Judgment is 
still proper. 
Even if this Court holds there was a trust set up by Nina as the settlor and Marie as 
the trustee, placing her funds in trust to be distributed to select friends and family members, 
this would not create a confidential relationship between the Respondent and the decedent, 
and the summary judgment dismissing the Petitioner's claims is appropriate. 
The Petitioner is making an inconsistent argument, he argues that the funds in the 
accounts should return to the estate because of a fiduciary relationship as trustee that Marie 
would have with the decedent; however, if such a trustee relationship did exist the alleged 
trust would not relinquish the funds to the estate and former will, but would remove the funds 
from the estate the same as a joint account. 
Additionally, if the Court holds there was a trust, Marie properly distributed or 
intended to distribute the funds according to her grandmother's wish. There was no evidence 
or even "inferences" indicating that Marie Jess did not distribute the funds "expeditiously and 
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in good faith" as her grandmother had wished. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-805. Where 
Marie Jess's testimony was that she intended to distribute her money to the family, "because 
[her] grandmother spoke of giving each- certain people money when she was still alive," 
even if there was a legal relationship, Marie Jess fulfilled all of her duties under such an 
alleged relationship, and this issue irrelevant. The Court should therefore uphold the district 
court's ruling on the Summary Judgment. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE PETITIONER DID 
NOT MEET HIS BURDEN WHERE HE DID NOT PROFFER ANY EVIDENCE 
THAT THE DECEDENT HAD A DIFFERENT INTENT WHEN SHE OPENED 
THE JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS. 
The court properly found that "Nina Tolley was very particular in communicating her 
intentions...regarding her banking and creation of the joint bank accounts with Respondent" 
and that "Petitioner has failed to produce evidence to support any of his various theories 
against Marie Jess." The law presumes that any "sums remaining on deposit at the death of 
a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party." Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(1). In 
order to overcome Marie's ownership of the funds, and place the funds within Nina's estate 
to be administered, Petitioner must have proven by clear and convincing evidence that Nina 
had "a different intention at the time the account was created." Id. 
"[Wjhere an intention to create a joint account is clearly expressed in a written 
contract executed by the parties, which remains unaltered, and there is no evidence of fraud, 
undue influence, mistake, or other infirmity, the question of intention ceases to be an issue 
and the Courts are bound by the agreement." First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Burgi, 251 P.2d 297, 
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301 (Utah 1952). "Likewise it is true that the fact that all the funds were contributed by one 
of the parties will not prevent the creation ot a joint tenancy in the account if all the essentials 
for the creation of such an account exist." Id. The Petitioner had the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that at the time the bank account was created the decedent did 
not wish Marie to have the right of survivorship, even though she was being placed as a joint' 
tenant with this right. Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104. This rule of law has been followed in the 
State of Utah for over half a century. See Cont 7 Bank & Trust Co. v. Kimball, 442 P.2d 472, 
474 (Utah 1968); See also Hobbs v. Fenton, 479 P.2d 472 (Utah 1971). 
The only case cited by the Appellant to support this issue is First Sec. Bank of Utah 
v. Demiris, 354 P.2d 97,99-100 (Utah 1960). In First Sec. Bank of Utah, an elderly husband 
places his estranged wife as a joint tenant for his convenience because he was entering the 
hospital. Id. at 98. Although legally married to him, she had been residing separately for 
thirteen years, and did not get along well with her husband. Id. While the husband was in the 
hospital, the wife withdrew all of his funds from the joint account. Id. at 99. The wife's 
purpose was to get possession of the funds for herself, with the intention of wrongfully 
depriving him of his rights therein. Id. 
The Supreme Court in First Sec. Bank of Utah, specifically stated the fact that the wife 
withdrew the funds during the lifetime of her husband was "significantly different" from the 
situation of Holt where the money was withdrawn from funds which remained in a joint 
account after the death of one of the tenants. Id. at 99; See also Holt v. Bayles, 39 P.2d 715 
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(Utah 1932). In First Sec. Bank of Utah, the Court placed compelling weight on the fact that 
the defendant had taken all of the money out of the account while the co-tenant was still 
living. 354 P.2d at 99. Acknowledging that the law presumes joint tenancy funds are 
transferred to the surviving joint tenant, the Supreme Court adopted an equitable rule from 
New York in that, when a joint tenant withdraws all of the funds from a joint account 
wrongly taking possession from the other tenant, " the withdrawal of monies from a joint 
account does not destroy a joint tenancy...it merely opens a door to competent evidence...that 
no joint tenancy was originally created or intended." Id. See also In re Kelly's Will 263 
N.Y.S.661,667. 
"Significantly different" from First Sec. Bank of Utah, Marie did not take the funds 
from the joint accounts until after the death of her grandmother, and at which point she had 
full ownership of the funds by contract and law. On September 25, 2003, Nina transferred 
funds to a new bank, First Utah Bank, into accounts she established in joint tenancy with 
rights of survivorship with Marie. The law presumes, unequivocally, that Nina intended 
those funds to belong to Marie through the right of survivorship thus established. It is 
presumptive that Ms. Tolley meant to do just what she did. All witnesses have testified that 
Nina was astute, mentally sharp and careful with her money. All witnesses testified that 
during the days surrounding the transfer, Nina continued to be mentally competent. The 
district court afforded Nina the same respect and consideration that all competent adults are 
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afforded, and presumed to have meant to do exactly what she actually did, where there is no 
evidence to the contrary. 
When Nina created the accounts, Mr. Claridge, the bank manager, discussed various 
banking options with Nina and she indicated to him she desired joint accounts. Marie did 
not participate in the discussion. Mr. Claridge discussed with Nina joint right of 
survivorship, to make sure she understand the reality of joint with right of survivorship, and 
that it gives Marie one hundred percent ownership. During his conversations with Nina he 
did not feel any indication that she was being coerced in any way, Nina was always 
comfortable with him and very cheerful and jovial. Because he recognized she was mentally 
sharp, he was satisfied that Nina understood the character of the joint account with the right 
of survivorship as well as any other who opens such an account. 
In his brief, Petitioner bases his claim on the fact that there "was no circumstance to 
suggest any affirmative intent on the part of the decedent to make a gift or transfer ownership 
of the funds outright to Appellee Jess." See Brief of Appellant page 19. Petitioner has mis-
interpreted the law, the intent of survivorship is presumed by the law, the burden is placed 
on him to produce clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the creation of the 
account Nina had a different intent. Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(1); See also Cont'l Bank & 
Trust Co., 442 P.2d at 474; Hobbs, 479 P.2d 472. 
The plain language of the statute requires that the Petitioner show that the decedent 
had another intent at the time she created the accounts. Id. (emphases added). Petitioner's 
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argument concerning Nina's prior will, which was drafted more than eleven years prior to 
opening these accounts is irrelevant. Also, there were changed circumstances that occurred 
between the decedent signing the will and her death. Her son Kenneth Miller died; Nina 
became estranged from her other two children, Donald Tolley and Cheryl Blaisdell; and, 
Nina moved to Utah to live with Kenneth's children who made many life adjustments to care 
for her and make her comfortable. "A right of survivorship arising from the express terms 
of the account or under this section...cannot be changed by will." Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-
104(5). 
Likewise, the arguments made by Petitioner concerning what happened to the funds 
after the death of Nina are irrelevant to her intent on September 25, 2003. Marie withdrew 
her money as a survivor of a joint account after the death of her grandmother, this is 
appropriate under law and in no way indicates Nina's intent months earlier. A joint tenant's 
later suggestion as to what becomes of a joint fund, would not break the joint tenancy 
contract and create a trust. Pagano, 539 P.2d at 455. Later conversations between Nina and 
Marie were made after the joint tenancy was created and are not clear and convincing 
evidence regarding Nina's prior intentions at the time the joint account was created. 
Evidence regarding the fact that Nina discussed with Mr. Claridge, the bank manager, 
the joint use of the funds in the account while Nina was alive does not indicate that she had 
a different intent for the funds after her death. Such discussions indicate that Nina fully 
understood that as a joint tenant, Marie could have "complete access to any of her bank 
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accounts to make sure that she [Marie] could maintain bills, hospital needs, [and] whatever 
else would come up." Moreover, even if the subject of survivorship was never discussed 
between Mr. Claridge and Nina, the lack of discussion is in no way an indication of different 
intention. Furthermore, such lack of discussion would clearly indicate that Petitioner did not 
meet his burden of showing a different intention by clear and convincing evidence. 
The Petitioner has failed to provide any case law which supports his position. Nina 
was mentally competent and perfectly able to transfer the money to a joint account with 
rights of survivorship with Marie, as she intended. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
clearly indicates that on September 25, 2003 Nina had any different intent, other than to 
create a regular joint account with the typical right of survivorship. The standard of clear and 
convincing evidence is high to protect decedents who can not rebut false testimony, where 
Petitioner did not meet his burden, and did not provide any relevant evidence that would 
indicate Mrs. Nina Tolley did not wish her granddaughter to have rights of survivorship, this 
Court should uphold the district court's rulings. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REVIEWED THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PETITIONER. 
The court properly reviewed all of the pleadings, evidence, admissions, and 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Petitioner and did not dismiss any 
facts which were material, relevant, and supported. Norman, 2002 UT 81, \\5. Petitioner 
had 29 additional pages available in his brief to more specifically inform the Court of any 
specific facts which he felt the district court had incorrectly dismissed. See Utah Rules App. 
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P. Rule 24(f). Notwithstanding, Petitioner writes less than one page and refers to only "the 
admissions of Appellee Jess and evidence of the decedent's intent." Appellee believes this 
subject was properly covered in the previous two sections of this reply brief. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the district court recognized that, "... the 
Petitioner relies on inferences which cannot be reasonably made and incorrect interpretations 
of the evidence in the record." (R. 1249, Appellant's Add. 4, p. 5 [Memorandum Decision].) 
"Bare contentions, unsupported by any specification of facts in support thereof, raise no 
material questions of fact." Schnuphase, 918 P.2d 476. "Mere assertion that an issue of fact 
exists without proper evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient." 
Webster, 675 P.2d 1170. 
The district court recognized that the Petitioner "skewed" testimony and inaccurately 
"interpreted testimony." (R. 1248, Appellant's Add. 4, p. 4 [Memorandum Decision].) 
Petitioner has again, in this appeal, continued his trend of misconstruing the facts. See Utah 
R. App. P. 24(k). The Petitioner continually misleads this court with untrue facts and 
statements, incomplete quotes, testimony taken out of context, and unreasonable inferences. 
For example, throughout the Petitioner's brief he alleges that Marie under oath 
admitted that she "acted exclusively as an administrator of the decedent's estate," that she 
"admitted to holding fiduciary duties," and that she admitted to "holding assets of the 
decedent in trust." See Appellant's Brief pp. 10, 11, 15, and 17. Petitioner supports these 
allegations by citing to the temporary restraining order hearing. During such hearing the 
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Respondent Marie, pro se at that time, never made such admissions. Marie continually stated 
that her "grandmother put this money into an account with my name, leaving me as the 
survivor, right of survivorship." (R. 606; Appellant's Add. 3, pp. 2; 9; 13; 15; 20; and 34.) 
She further testified that the will (probate) was not applicable to funds where they were not 
in the estate because of the right of survivorship. (R. 606; Appellant's Add. 3, p. 20.) She 
expressed she was not legally obligated to give portions of her money to family members, 
but she did so because her "grandmother had asked." 
A second example where the Petitioner has misled the Court is the manner he skewed 
the testimony of Mr. Claridge, the Bank Manager. On page nine, paragraph eight of the 
Appellant's brief, Petitioner states, "the legal ramifications of right of survivorship and 
associated consequences at death pointedly were not [discussed]." Nina and Mr. Claridge 
discussed the joint right of survivorship. (R. 1149-50.) Mr. Claridge testified "I do 
specifically remember discussing with her [Nina] the joint with right of survivorship topic 
as we signed the card...[we] discussed the ownership and that is a 100 percent ownership by 
both parties." (R. 1129-34 [Claridge Depo. At 34:4-12(emphasis added)].) Mr. Claridge was 
satisfied that Nina understood the character of the joint account with the right of survivorship 
as well as any other who opens such accounts. (R. 1149-50.) Moreover, he tends to discuss 
joint accounts and the right of survivorship more extensively with elderly people. (R. 1150.) 
A third example is Petitioner's statement that Nina went through a "series of high 
level spending" following her move to Utah. See Appellant's Brief p. 4. The Petitioner 
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during oral argument specified that "petitioner's primary evidence [of undue influence] is the 
decedent's spending habits shortly before her death, as compared to her frugality throughout 
her life." The evidence indicates that Nina was mentally sharp and especially sharp with her 
finances. There was no "high level spending," but only the payment of reasonable and 
foreseeable expenses related to moving a person such as Nina. Nina saved for the move, and 
it is reasonable to anticipate moving would require some spending. Again, where Nina was 
found to be mentally strong willed, decisive and sharp, such spending does not indicate 
anything other than she chose to pay for the typical moving expenses. Evidence indicates 
money went toward remodeling the home, remodeling which was necessary to meet her 
needs, (i.e. wheelchair ramp) and in no way would indicate that Nina had ceased to be frugal 
with her money. 
After evaluating the evidence and the reasonable inferences fairly drawn from that 
evidence, this Court will find that Petitioner, through his several and various attempts, has 
failed to provide any evidence in support of the essential elements for his claims. Therefore, 
it was proper for the district court to grant the summary judgment on the Respondents' 
behalf. Hale v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240,12,74 P.3d 628 (overruled for other grounds). 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE FRAUD AND CONVERSION CLAIMS AND THIS COURT 
SHOULD AFFIRM THE RULING. 
The district court also granted the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the fraud and conversion claims. Even though the Petitioner has not briefed these claims, it 
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is clear this Court should affirm the district court's order. The petitioner failed to plead and 
establish the elements of fraud at the district court level. To prove fraud, in the absence of 
a confidential relationship, Petitioner had to proffer evidence indicating that Respondents 
knowingly misrepresented a material fact with the intent to induce Nina to act or refrain from 
action and that Nina reasonably relying on the misrepresentation, acted to her detriment. 
Blodgett v. MartcK 590 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1978). 
Likewise, the Petitioner failed to set forth the essential elements of a conversion 
claim. Petitioner failed to cite any law that would allow a conversion claim to proceed, 
where "conversion is an act of willful interference with chattel, done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." Fibro 
Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Financial, Inc., 974 P.2d 288 (Utah 1999). Where there was no 
evidence of fraud or conversion, the district court properly dismissed those claims on 
summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Appellees respectfully request that the Court affirm 
the district court's Order Granting Summary Judgment of all claims. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
(Utah Code Ann. §75-7-805) 
75-7-805. Costs of administration. 
In administering a trust, the trustee may incur only costs that are reasonable in relation to 
the trust property, the purposes of the trust, and the skills of the trustee. 
ADDENDUM 2 
(Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(k)) 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references, (a)(3) A table of authorities 
with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references 
to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the 
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part 
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief 
under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review 
shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the 
record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of 
the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state 
the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum 
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not 
reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion 
of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(11 )(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as 
the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
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(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, 
except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may refer 
to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-
appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the 
reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may 
be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum 
references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations 
used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms Such as "the 
employee," "the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 11 (b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits 
shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or 
rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall 
not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule.,In cases 
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be 
deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to 
file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the 
issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall 
reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-
Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause shown may upon 
motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the 
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion 
filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking 
more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is 
granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court. 
Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, 
including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party after 
that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the 
appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the 
reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged 
with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney 
fees against the offending lawyer. 
Advisory Committee Note. Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley, 
883 P.2d 1343,1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully 
appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate 
themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the 
marshalling duty..., the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists."' ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold 
Storage and Warehouse, inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting West Valley 
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See also State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 
1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and citation of 
supporting authority. 
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